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Abstract
We study the impact of social ties on behavior in two types of asym-
metric coordination games. Social ties are varied by making players
interact with partners from different in-groups (fellow members of their
own sports team, members of their sports club, students of their uni-
versity). Subjective social ties are further measured by direct question-
naires.
We find that smaller and more salient in-groups lead to significantly
more group beneficial choices. The same effect is observed for play-
ers that report high values of their subjective social ties. We discuss
the implication of these results for theories assuming that socially tied
individuals follow some group beneficial reasoning.
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1 Introduction
Behavior in interactions requiring coordination is intrinsically difficult to pre-
dict. While participants in coordination problems clearly prefer to coordi-
nate, reaching this state in the absence of communication is not trivial. Focal
points help in symmetric games but might not be strong enough when games
are asymmetric (Crawford et al., 2008). Incidentally human interactions are
never completely void of information about interaction partners. When we
interact with others, we take into account people’s nationality, looks, gender,
political preferences, or favorite sports team. Group membership of others
leads us to anticipate certain behaviors or influences our concerns for their
welfare. These effects have, over the last years, received increased attention
in economics and psychology. Specifically recent experimental evidence has
investigated the importance of a joint social identity on coordination among
multiple Pareto ranked equilibria (Chen and Li, 2009).
In this paper, we investigate how the level of connectedness with others
influences coordination in a setting where coordination comes at a cost for the
individual. Our results show that even in asymmetric games where one player
has to accept an individual cost, coordination on a group beneficial outcome
is increased with increasing connectedness. We investigate this effect with two
games: an asymmetric coordination game (baseline game) and an extension
of this game where one player has to make a conscious choice to enter the
coordination game (the entrance game). The entrance game enables us to
investigate how social connectedness influences the interpretation of moves by
the other. We observe that stronger social connectedness increases players’
beliefs that others will focus on group beneficial outcomes.
The importance of social identity in economics has been pointed out by
the seminal work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Social identity theory based
itself on the assumption that an individual is not characterized by one unique
‘personal self’, but rather by many ‘selves’ that correspond to overlapping
circles of group identities. Different cues might trigger the individuals to act
and feel on their personal, family or national ‘level of self’ (Turner et al., 1987).
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While social identity theory clearly considers the importance of different levels
or ‘strength’ of social identity, the main experimental approach has focused on
identifying a ‘minimal group’ level, which allows us to observe discriminatory
behavior. Primarily based on this ‘minimal group paradigm’, a large body of
evidence has been collected in psychology (e.g. Brewer, 1979, 1999; De Dreu,
2012; De Dreu et al., 2012; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Yamagishi and Kiyonari,
2000) and economics (e.g. Bernhard et al., 2006; Buchan et al., 2006; Chavanne
et al., 2011; Goette et al., 2012) on in-group vs out-group behavior. Since
the seminal work by Tajfel et al. (1971), results support the idea that even
minimal group membership enhances behavior beneficial for group members,
sometimes at the expenses of the out-group (i.e., people who are not members
of the group).
In our own experimental investigation, we aim at getting back to the initial
concerns of social identity theory for different ‘levels’ of identity. The question
is how behavior is changed when we interact with a person we know very well
compared to a person we are only minimally tied with. What to expect is
not immediately obvious. Stronger ties with others might influence our con-
cerns for their outcome according to existing theories of social preferences (e.g.
Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Alternatively, stronger
ties might lead to better predictions of choices or preferences of others. Fi-
nally, stronger connectedness might induce other types of reasoning that focus
on the group’s outcome (e.g. Bacharach, 1999; Sugden, 2000, 2003).
Recent experimental evidence has indeed observed that, for the case of
symmetric games, an ‘enhanced’ minimal group paradigm enables coordination
among multiple Pareto ranked equilibria (Chen and Chen, 2011). Similarly
Gaechter et al. (2012) observe that players that score higher on a psychological
measure of shared identity (‘one’-ness) are more likely to coordinate on high
effort levels in a weakest link game. We will base our analysis on a basic
definition of a social tie between two individuals proposed in Attanasi et al.
(2014). Specifically, we assume that the minimal criterion for the existence
of a social tie between two individuals is for them to commonly believe that
they share the same social features that define both of their social identities.
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We further assume that a social tie between two individuals has a quantitative
dimension. The social tie between individuals will get stronger for either a
stronger objective overlapping of their aims and goals; or for a subjective
stronger feeling of connectedness with the other.
The predictions derived by Chen and Chen (2011) for coordination games
are based on the concept of potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996),
which restrict the analysis to symmetric games. Asymmetric games have been
investigated in the context of a minimal group paradigm by Charness et al.
(2007). They show that coordination on an in-group beneficial outcome in-
creases when a ‘hosting’ in-group player interacts with a ‘guest’ out-group
player and these roles are made salient. Asymmetric games have however not
yet been investigated for the case of different levels of connectedness among
interacting players. Stronger connectedness might favor coordination on out-
comes that are considered as better for the group. For example, take a battle
of the sexes game that does not offer symmetric payoffs dependent on which
outcome the players agree on. Consider the classical example of Ann and Bob
that have to choose between going to the opera or to a football game. Though
Ann might prefer the opera and Bob the football game, Ann might have a
higher utility from the football game than Bob from the opera. Thus the
overall efficiency for the couple is higher when they coordinate on the football
game. Our results will show that increased group identity will indeed enhance
the focal value of such group beneficial outcomes.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the two
versions of an asymmetric coordination game (the baseline and entrance game)
studied in this paper. We further discuss how social ties are measured. Specif-
ically we distinguish between objective ties (which refer to the type of partners
a subject interacts with) and subjective ties (which correspond to a subject’s
own perception about social relationships within a group). Section 3 gives the
procedures of the experiment and Section 4 presents results from both coordi-
nation games, depending on both types of social ties (objective and subjective).
Finally, Section 5 discusses the theoretical implications of our results.
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2 Experimental Design
In the following, we will introduce two coordination games to study social ties:
the first is a variant of the battle of the sexes game that we call the ‘baseline
game’; the second extends the previous game by adding an outside option and
is named the ‘entrance game’.
2.1 The baseline game
The coordination game that we consider is a simultaneous move game with
two players (1 for row and 2 for column), each of which has to choose between
two available actions A and B. The corresponding payoff matrix is represented
in Figure 1(a). As in the battle of the sexes, the worst scenario for both
players is to miscoordinate (i.e., playing A while the other plays B or vice
versa). Furthermore, the players have diverging preferences regarding the best
outcome for themselves: player 1 prefers coordination on (A,A) while player 2
prefers coordination on (B,B). However, unlike the classical battle of the sexes
game, the lowest payoff is different in the two coordination outcomes: outcome
(B,B) is worth more to player 1 than outcome (A,A) is worth to player 2. In
spite of this difference, the game theoretic properties of this asymmetric battle
of the sexes game remain as in the classical case: both (A,A) and (B,B) are
the only pure-strategy Nash equilibria, which also are the only Pareto optimal
outcomes.1
The main feature of this game lies on the impact of group preferences
on players’ behavior. As in the battle of the sexes, being self-interested is
not sufficient to guarantee coordination success. However, in our asymmetric
game, one can notice the existence of a focal point for the group that is not
present in the classical battle of the sexes game: out of the two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria, the outcome (B,B) seems better for the group. Whether
one considers the sum, the average, the difference, or the minimum value
1There also exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, which consists of playing A
with probability 7/8 for player 1 and playing B with probability 7/10 for player 2 (in this
case, the respective expected payoffs are 10.5 for player 1, and 4.4 for player 2).
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(a) The baseline game (asymmetric battle
of the sexes game).
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(0,0)
(b) The entrance game (asymmetric battle
of the sexes game with outside option).
Figure 1: Baseline and entrance game.
among the individual payoffs as a measure of the group’s utility, this outcome
always outperforms every other solution. In fact, the asymmetry in the players’
payoffs creates some incentives for them to favor the group as a whole, which
might allow them to also maximize their self interest (any coordination is
always better than miscoordination). Both players may then consider this
solution as a focal point that can be used to reach coordination. However, one
should note that, as the corresponding solution (B,B) favors player 2 more
than it favors player 1 (what is best for the group is also best for player 2),
coordination is not guaranteed. We will investigate whether participants in
the role of player 1 detect and follow the focal point (B,B), and which factors
weaken or strengthen the focus on it.
2.2 The entrance game
We extend the asymmetric game presented above to the ‘entrance game’ by
adding an outside option (see Figure 1(b)). In this two-player game, prior to
playing the coordination game itself, player 1 is offered the possibility of a
fixed outside option. If he chooses to enter the coordination game (play ‘In’)
both players play the asymmetric battle of the sexes game as described in the
previous section. If he takes the outside option (play ‘Out’), the game ends
with player 1 earning 20 and player 2 earning 10.
The outside option makes participation in the coordination game a volun-
tary decision by player 1. Entering the game can therefore be interpreted as
a signal to play a certain strategy. How this signal is interpreted will depend
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on player 2’s beliefs about player 1’s motivations: specifically if player 1 is
expected to be self-interested or to take the group interest into account.
Before expanding this forward induction argument, let us notice that the
entrance game contains three Nash equilibria in pure strategies: ((In,A),A),
((Out,A),B), ((Out,B),B).2 Considering subgame perfect Nash equilibria by
backward induction allows us to rule out the solution ((Out,A),B).3
Forward induction then allows us to restrict the set of subgame perfect
Nash equilibria to those solutions that survive the iterated elimination of
weakly dominated strategies. Initially player 1’s strategy (In,B) is weakly (and
strictly) dominated by any strategy involving Out. Then player 2’s strategy
B becomes weakly dominated by A. Thus player 1’s strategies (Out,A) and
(Out,B) are both weakly (and strictly) dominated by (In,A). Therefore, the
unique forward induction solution is ((In,A),A).
Indeed, assuming common knowledge that both players are fully rational
and motivated by their own self interest, this solution should be played. When
playing In, player 1 signals that he intends to play A in the subgame (if he
intended to play B, he would have been better off playing Out in the first
place). Therefore, as a best response, player 2’s unique rational move is to
play A. Finally, since outcome ((In,A),A) is better for player 1 than selecting
Out, he chooses (In,A).4
The interesting characteristics that this analysis brings about is that the
validity of this forward induction argument is independent of player 2’s prefer-
ences. This therefore suggests that such a game introduces some ‘first mover’
advantage, assuming there is common knowledge that both players are self-
interested agents. Let us also point out that such a forward induction argument
has already received wide experimental support in the literature (e.g. Brandts
2Moreover, the entrance game also has Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, which consist
of player 1 always playing Out (i.e., selecting either strategy (Out,A) or strategy (Out,B)
with probability 1) and player 2 playing B with probability 3/7.
3There also exists a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies, which consists of player 1
always choosing Out first and playing B with probability 1/8 in the subgame; while player
2 plays B with probability 7/10.
4Note that no Nash equilibrium in mixed/behavioral strategies does resist this forward
induction argument.
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and Holt, 1989; Cooper et al., 1992, 1993; Van Huyck et al., 1993; Balkenborg,
1994; Brandts and Holt, 1995; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; Shahriar, 2009).
However, if players focus on some collective goals and expect others to do
the same, entering the subgame will be associated with a choice of B. As a
result, stronger social ties with a group might lead to either effect: a stronger
belief in individual rationality of partners that are more identifiable (group
members) or a stronger belief in collective rationality by group members. In
the former case, ((In,A),A) will be played. In the latter case the outcome will
be ((In,B),B).
Specifically, the entrance game will enable us to observe if players linked by
stronger social ties are more likely to expect coordination in the subgame and
therefore more likely to enter the second stage of the game (when acting as
player 1). In turn, reactions by player 2 will allow us to investigate whether and
how – via coordination on either (A,A) or (B,B) – this intention is understood.
The baseline game will serve us as control to see whether the first stage is
always needed to signal intentions.
2.3 Varying social ties
We vary the strength of social ties by considering partners that come from
more or less strongly linked ‘in-groups’. More precisely, we investigate three
levels of ‘in-groups’: the weakest level of social ties concerns our treatment
university. In this treatment, participants know that they will interact with a
fellow student from their own university. Note that this is the default in most
laboratory experiments and therefore the possibility of social ties between
such participants is assumed to be minimal. Our strongest level of social ties
concerns our treatment team in which two players from the same volleyball
team interact. Teams consist of 7 to 9 players and meet at least once per week
for a two-hour training session. Note that interactions were anonymous in the
sense that no participant could identify his interaction partner from the game.
However it was common knowledge that both participants were members of
the same team. A third treatment gives some intermediate level of social ties:
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club. Here both participants were members of the same volleyball club, but
not playing in the same team. The club had around 70 members and members
might interact before and after training with players that were not from their
own team.
We further elicited through questionnaires how well the players saw them-
selves linked to their teammates and how they considered the relationship
between their teammates. We use these measures to determine subjective
social ties. Participants responded to two types of scales.
The first scale (direct scale) asked with respect to each team member ‘how
do you think this person feels about you?’ (see Figure 7 in the Appendix for an
example). Participants could choose between ‘likes me a lot’, ‘likes me’, ‘dis-
likes me’ and ‘is indifferent’.5 Answers to this measure allow us to determine
how well the individual feels ‘liked’ and thus connected to his team (index of
subjective connectedness of the self to the group). Specifically, for every par-
ticipant i, the corresponding coefficient of i’s belief about self connectedness
to the group G (i ∈ G) is determined by:
kSi =
Ni
|G| − 1
where |G| denotes the size of the team and Ni defines the number of individuals
in G that participant i believes to strongly like him. Specifically, Ni indicates
how many times the answer ‘the other likes me a lot’ was selected by i in the
questionnaire. Note that kSi simply stands for the probability that individual
i interacts with a person he believes to strongly like him.
Let us also define the average self connectedness KS within the group G
as follows:
KS =
∑
i∈G k
S
i
|G|
We will use this measure later to determine whether an individual scores
more or less high concerning beliefs about his own popularity compared to his
5Participants also answered for each team member whether they ‘liked a lot’, ‘liked’ or
‘disliked’ this person. Answers were strongly correlated with the indirect question.
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team mates.
The second scale (indirect scale) aimed at eliciting ties between team mem-
bers as perceived by the participant. To do so, each participant i was asked
to indicate for any two members of his team whether he considered them to
be ‘friends’ (for an example, see Figure 8 in the Appendix). The scale was
presented in a visual intuitive form with all team members’ photographs ar-
ranged in a circle, where participants were asked to indicate by a line any two
members they thought to be friends (excluding themselves).6 In the example
from Figure 8, individual C responds to the questionnaire and indicates her
belief that F is friend with A and G, that G is also friend with E, and that D
and B are friends.
Based on answers to this measure, we construct an index of the individual
belief about the groups connectedness kGi . Specifically, we hypothesize that in
our game, behavior does not only depend on the individual’s closeness to every
other member, but also on the belief about every other member’s closeness to
each other. To illustrate this assumption, imagine a group of four individuals
(Alice, Bob, Carol, and Daniel) and suppose it is common knowledge that
Alice is equally close to Bob, Carol, and Daniel, while these three characters
are not tied with each other. In the case where every individual is equally
likely to interact with any other group member, Alice is indifferent between
interacting with the three others (she is sure to interact with someone she
is tied with). However, Bob, Carol, and Daniel are not indifferent: they all
prefer to interact with Alice, which turns out to be a rather unlikely event
with probability p = 1/3. As a result, Bob, Carol, and Daniel can be seen as
weakly tied with the group. Concerning coordination, Alice thus needs to take
this into account and should act as if she is a weekly tied participant (if she
does not, she exposes herself to the risk of performing some group-regarding
behavior that is not reciprocated).
For every participant i, the corresponding coefficient of i’s belief about the
group connectedness is calculated as follows:
6During the experiment, participants were notified that any link that would involve
themselves in this question would simply be ignored.
10
kGi =
N−i
M
where N−i represent the estimated number of links in the group G (according
to i’s beliefs) that do not involve i,7 and M corresponds to the maximum
number of individual links that are possible in the group without individual i:
M =
(|G| − 1
2
)
=
(|G| − 1) · (|G| − 2)
2
Note that kGi resembles the concept of a local clustering coefficient, which
characterizes the probability that two randomly selected neighbors of i are tied
with each other (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Newman, 2003). As an illustrative
example from Figure 8 in the Appendix, assuming the corresponding answer
was made by individual C, we would obtain kGC =
4
21
.
Let us also define the average group connectedness KG within some group
G as follows:
KG =
∑
i∈G k
G
i
|G|
3 Experimental Procedure
Participants in our experiments were students from the University of Toulouse
(Capitole) who were also members of the main university volleyball club. Dur-
ing a preliminary meeting, every active member of the club was proposed to
participate in our study. Upon acceptance, every participant was then pho-
tographed for later use in the questionnaire (see Figures 7 and 8 in the Ap-
pendix for examples).
The experiment was run in November 2011 during two training sessions.
In total, 70 subjects participated (37 men and 33 women). At the beginning
of the academic year (September 2011), volleyball players within the club were
divided into 9 single-sex teams: 5 male teams and 4 female teams. Teams had
7A link not involving player i is a connection between two players j and h, where j and
h are different from i.
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between 7 and 9 members. Another 43 students were recruited from the same
university as partners for the game played with another university student.
Data from these observations are not discussed in this paper.
The experiment was run by paper and pencil during training sessions. Sub-
jects first filled out a demographic questionnaire and answered to the direct
and indirect scales for social ties. Social ties were elicited before the games
were played to prevent an impact of game behavior on social tie measures.
Presenting the questionnaire before the game further ensures that participants
were aware of their social ties to the team and that they were aware that other
participants had also been asked the same questions.
Every participant was then asked to report strategies for the baseline game
and the entrance game according to three different types of reference groups.
All treatment comparisons are therefore on a within-subject level. Indeed,
within-subject comparison seems necessary for our research question, since
social ties are necessarily individual characteristics. To control for order effects
between the baseline game and the entrance game, the order of games was
counterbalanced across subjects. The detailed instructions of both games are
described in Sections B.2 and B.4 of the Appendix.
The three in-group treatments (team, club and university) were played by
every subject and the order was inverted for half of the sessions. However,
since answers were given by paper and pencil, participants were free to answer
these questions in any order they wished. Participants responded by meta-
strategy method for each possible treatment, i.e., all subjects had to indicate
their decision if assigned the role of player 1, as well as their decision if assigned
the role of player 2. This was made for both the baseline and the entrance
game, and for each possible treatment, i.e. if playing with a university student,
a club member, or a teammate (12 decisions as a whole). Participants were
informed that only upon completion of the questionnaire, their role, the game,
and the treatment selected for payout would be randomly determined.
The experiment lasted approximately one hour. Earnings were payed out
during the next training sessions in December 2011. The payment method,
which was specified to all subjects in the instructions (see Section B.1 from the
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Appendix), consisted of randomly drawing one role (i.e., player 1 or player 2),
one game (i.e., entrance game or baseline game), one treatment (i.e., university,
club, or team), and one co-player (depending on the treatment). A subject’s
payoff was therefore defined according to his choice made as the selected player
in the selected situation (which corresponds to the selected treatment in the
selected game), and the selected co-player’s choice in the same situation. Each
effective payment was made individually and anonymously through random
draws taken in front of the concerned participant.8 Earnings included a 5
euros show-up fee. Mean earnings were about 19 euros9 (standard deviation
of 12 euros, with a maximum of 40 euros and a minimum of 5 euros).
4 Results
We will start the analysis by considering differences across the three different
treatments (determining different types of partners). In addition to this ex-
ogenous variation of ties to the interaction partner, we will in a second part
consider whether similar patterns can be observed when considering the sub-
jective measures of social ties as defined above (through coefficients kSi and
kGi ).
4.1 Objective social ties
We first present descriptive statistics concerning the players’ behavior in both
the baseline game and the entrance game, for the three treatment scenarios
(i.e., team, club and university). Note that in this case, the social ties are
considered objective as their strength is exogenously controlled by changing
the type of a participant’s interaction partner. Since we observe no order effect
regarding which game or treatment was presented first, we will in the following
pool data from the different sessions.
8The random selection of the co-player was made through a random code name to pre-
serve anonymity between subjects.
9Approximately 25 US dollars at the time of the experiment (1 euro = 1.4 US dollars).
13
68#
58#
49#
77# 77# 74#
0#
10#
20#
30#
40#
50#
60#
70#
80#
90#
100#
Team# Club# University#
Ch
oo
si
ng
(B
((%
)(
Player#1# Player#2#
*#
***#
Figure 2: Behavior in the baseline game for all players in each type of matching.
Significance levels based on Wilcoxon signed rank tests: p < 0.01 (∗∗∗); p < 0.1
(∗). Data recorded by meta-strategy method thus each bar consists of 69
observations.
4.1.1 Baseline game
We present choices in the baseline game, depending on whether the correspond-
ing co-player is a teammate, a club member, or a fellow university student in
Figure 2 (detailed results can be found in Table 4 of the Appendix).
Let us recall the predictions concerning the impact of social ties for player
1 and player 2. Specifically, for player 2, the own payoff maximizing outcome
coincides with the outcome that is best for the group (i.e. (B,B)). Meanwhile
player 1 faces a choice between the own payoff maximizing outcome (A,A) and
the outcome that is considered as best for the group (B,B). Increasing social
ties is therefore expected to increase the percentage of players 1 choosing
option B. This is indeed what we observe. As we see in Figure 2, an increasing
percentage of players 1 select option B when the social tie with the interaction
group increases. We can reject the null hypothesis that player 1 is making the
same choice when paired with a university student as when interacting with a
teammate (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.002). For the intermediate level
of the social tie (i.e. the club treatment), behavior is situated between the two
extremes.
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Figure 3: Behavior in the entrance game. Significance levels based on Wilcoxon
signed rank tests: p < 0.01 (∗∗∗); p < 0.05 (∗∗). Data recorded by meta-strategy
method thus 69 observations per treatment and player role.
When acting in the role of player 2, subjects clearly favor option B in all
types of interactions.10 Varying the strength of the social tie has no impact on
choices by player 2. While this is in line with the prediction that self interest
and group interest are not at conflict for player 2, this also implies that they
do not seem to anticipate player 1 being influenced by the strength of the
social tie. We will next use our observations from the entrance game to see
whether player 2 is more likely to take the treatment difference into account
when he knows that player 1 has to make an active choice to participate in
the coordination game.
4.1.2 Entrance game
In the context of the entrance game, our first observation is that participants
interacting with a team member in contrast to a university student are signif-
icantly more likely to enter the second stage of the entrance game (Wilcoxon
signed rank test: p = 0.004). Recall that agents will only enter the second
stage of the game if they believe that this will lead to an outcome that is
on some dimension preferable to the outside option. Under the assumption
10Note that in this case, player 2’s average behavior is close to the optimal mixed strategy
i.e., playing B with probability 7/10.
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that others will maximize own income and that others expect the agent to do
the same, this might lead to the forward induction reasoning that results in
choosing A in the subgame. If however agents focus on some collective goals
and expect others to do the same, entering the subgame will be associated
with a choice of B. As a result, stronger social ties with a team might lead
to either effect: a stronger belief in individual rationality of partners that are
more identifiable (teammates) or a stronger belief in collective rationality by
team members.
We present choices concerning both roles in the entrance game, depending
on whether interacting with a teammate, a club member, or a fellow university
student in Figure 3. For player 1, we focus on strategies (In,A), (In,B), and
Out.
Figure 3(a) allows us to reject the hypothesis that social ties promote
forward induction focused on individual rationality. Indeed, the proportion of
subjects selecting strategy (In,A) is similar in all treatments. On the other
hand, Figure 3(a) shows that subjects are significantly more likely to choose
(In,B) when interacting at the team level than at the university level (39% vs
20%, Wilcoxon signed rank test: p = 0.003). This shows a significant fraction
of participants that switch from selecting Out when interacting with a fellow
university student, to selecting (In,B) when interacting with an individual from
their team.
We further observe no significant difference between player 1’s behavior in
the second stage of the entrance game (i.e., after choosing In) and choices in
the baseline game from Section 4.1.1. Among the subjects who played In in the
first stage, we observe that option B is selected for: 63% (team), 56% (club)
and 48% (university) of participants. As this behavior is very similar to that
in the baseline game from Figure 2 (Wilcoxon signed rank tests: p = 0.405
in team treatment, p = 0.527 in club treatment, p = 0.257 in university
treatment), we conclude that the outside option of the entrance game has only
a negligible effect on player 1’s behavior in the coordination game. In other
words, right after playing In, player 1 tends to consider the subgame as a new
independent game. We will get back to this observation in Section 4.3 when
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discussing the joint meta-strategy behind the veil of ignorance whether the
agent will act as player 1 or 2.
We now turn to the question of whether choices in the role of player 2
are also unaffected by the outside option. Matched with fellow university
students, we observe that choices as player 2 are indeed influenced by the
outside option as forward induction would assume. Specifically 64% of players
2 choose B in the entrance game, while 74% choose this option in the baseline
game (Wilcoxon signed rank test: p = 0.07). We further observe from Figure
3(b) that, when playing with a team member, player 2 chooses B significantly
more often than when interacting with a university student (Wilcoxon signed
rank test: p = 0.049). These results therefore confirm the hypothesis that
social ties help people to coordinate on the most group beneficial outcome.
4.2 Subjective social ties
We will now extend our analysis to include the subjective measures of social
ties as defined in Section 2.3. As discussed previously, every subject in our
experiment was asked to provide subjective information about whether they
believed their teammates to like them and how much they considered their
teammates to be friends with each other. Using these answers, we calculate
two subjective measures of social ties for each individual i: kSi and k
G
i .
To analyze the relation between these measures and behavior in our games,
we categorize participants as ranking either above (HS and HG) or below (LS
and LG) the average answers in their own team (i.e., KS and KG respectively).
By doing so, we avoid the possible confound that some teams might be more
closely tied than others and focus on the relative part of the measure.
Table 1 summarizes the classification with respect to the group average
concerning (a) self connectedness (KS) and (b) group connectedness (KG).
The two measures show no statistically significant correlation (Pearson’s chi-
squared test: χ2=1.464, p = 0.226). We therefore consider these two types of
measures separately throughout the following analysis.
The objective of the next sections is to identify subjective measures that
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Category Condition N
(a) HS kSi ≥ KS 38
LS kSi < K
S 31
(b) HG kGi ≥ KG 30
LG kGi < K
G 39
Table 1: Classifications based on subjective reports relative to average in group
concerning (a) self connectedness (KS), and (b) group connectedness (KG).
allow us to replicate the previous observed results for the objective variation
of social connectedness. While the previous section focused on a compari-
son between participants paired with team members, club members, or fellow
university students, this section will compare behavior at the team level for
participants scoring either high or low on the different subjective measures.
4.2.1 Baseline game
We start our analysis with observations from the baseline game. Recall that
in Section 4.1.1 we found a significant treatment effect for choices of player 1.
We will thus focus, in the following, on choices by player 1 when interacting
with another team member. Our comparison will be between individuals cat-
egorized as either ‘high’ or ‘low’ for either our measure of self connectedness
(HS and LS respectively) or group connectedness (HG and LG respectively).
As a control, we will also present results concerning choices when interacting
with a fellow university student. Recall that both connectedness measures
were recorded with respect to team members. A good measure of the social
connectedness at the team level should therefore show no effect on choices
when interacting with an individual at the university level.
Figure 4(a) summarizes choices for self and group connectedness at the
team level (see also Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix). We observe an effect for
both self and group connectedness, marginal in the first case (Mann-Whitney
test comparing HS vs LS: p = 0.109) and significant in the latter (Mann-
Whitney test comparing HG vs LG: p = 0.018). In both cases, participants
reporting high values concerning connectedness are more likely to choose the
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Figure 4: Player 1’s behavior in the baseline game. (a) Team treatment;
(b) University treatment. Significance levels based on Mann-Whitney tests:
p < 0.05 (∗∗). Data recorded by meta-strategy method thus 69 observations
per treatment.
group beneficial outcome B.
Looking at choices by the same groups of participants in the university
treatment (see Figure 4(b)), we can now disentangle whether the effect is due
to an increased concern for others in the team or whether the measures also
pick up some other effect. Indeed in both cases, the same tendency observed
in the team treatment is also observed in the university treatment (Mann-
Whitney test in the university treatment: HS vs LS : p = 0.115; HG vs
LG: p = 0.042). Both measures thus seem to be related to individual char-
acteristics that lead agents to make more group beneficial choices in general.
One possible interpretation could be that participants scoring high on either
of the connectedness measures are genuinely fair, regardless of their partner’s
identity. An alternative interpretation is that these individuals can more easily
detect outcome (B,B) as the focal point that might help solve the coordination
problem. Following this interpretation, they play B to maximize the welfare of
the group in the ‘team’ treatment and to maximize their own individual payoff
in the ‘university’ treatment. Indeed, it is worth recalling that, besides being
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Figure 5: Player 1’s behavior in the entrance game. (a) Team treatment;
(b) University treatment. Significance levels based on Mann-Whitney tests:
p < 0.05 (∗∗); p < 0.01 (∗∗∗). Data recorded by meta-strategy method thus 69
observations per treatment.
the fairest outcome, (B,B) is also a Nash equilibrium in the baseline game.
To distinguish between these two hypotheses, we will next analyze the results
from the entrance game.
4.2.2 Entrance game
Recall that in the entrance game, a treatment effect was observed as well
for player 1 as for player 2 when interacting with a team member (see Section
4.1.2). The focus by both players on action B is striking given that the outcome
((In,B),B) is not a Nash equilibrium.
As in the previous section, we now present behavior by player 1 and player
2 in the team treatment in Figures 5(a) and 6(a) respectively (see also Tables
7-12 in the Appendix). We observe from Figure 5(a) that both the group and
the individual connectedness measures are correlated with player 1’s decision
to select strategy (In,B) (self connectedness: 50% vs 26%; Mann-Whitney
test: p = 0.042; group connectedness: 57% vs 26%; Mann-Whitney test:
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Figure 6: Player 2’s behavior in the entrance game. (a) Team treatment;
(b) University treatment. Significance levels based on Mann-Whitney tests:
p < 0.05 (∗∗). Data recorded by meta-strategy method thus 69 observations
per treatment.
p = 0.009). However, when we turn to behavior as player 2, we observe a
difference between the two measures (see Figure 6(a)). Recall that player 2 in
this game has to understand the possible reasons that might lead player 1 to
enter the game. Behavior as player 2 is very similar no matter the reports of the
individuals’ self connectedness (proportion of selecting B: 76% vs 77%). Thus
believing that one is liked by many other players is not sufficient to conclude
that these other players would in an anonymous interaction take a risky choice
(B vs A) with any person from the team. Meanwhile, we observe that the
group connectedness measure is significantly coorelated with player 2’s choice
(proportion of selecting B: 90% vs 67%; Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.016). Thus
players that believe in a high interconnectedness in their team are more likely
to believe that player 1 enters the game to play the group beneficial outcome.
As before, we can also compare these results to behavior when interacting
with a fellow university student. We observe from Figures 5(b) and 6(b) that
there exists no significant correlation between the connectedness measures and
choices at the university level. This clearly indicates that subjective beliefs
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concerning self and group connectedness are only related to behavior (as player
1 and player 2) when interacting with a team member. It thus seems that
subjective beliefs about self and group connectedness are rather correlated
with an ability to identify the focal nature of the (B,B) outcome and not to a
higher level of fairness (see hypotheses at the end of Section 4.2.1).
4.3 Behind the veil of ignorance
Recall that in our experiment, strategies were elicited by meta-strategy method
for the case of being selected as either player 1 or player 2. This allows us to
add to the previous discussion, an analysis of behavior in the ‘original position’
of the meta-game before actual roles were assigned (Rawls, 1971).
To analyze behavior in the meta-game, we need to consider equilibria for
the higher order symmetric game. We will denote strategies for this game as
(x1, x2), where x1 indicates the choice when assigned to the role of player 1
and x2 the choice for the role of player 2.
In the baseline game, four distinct strategies exist: (A,A), (B,B), (A,B) and
(B,A). The payoff matrix concerning expected earnings from the transformed
game can be found in Table 13 of the Appendix. We can easily see that there
exist three different pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (1) both players selecting
(A,A); (2) both players selecting (B,B); and (3) one player selecting (A,B)
while the other chooses (B,A). Note that the third solution is not consistent
with making a decision in Rawls’ original position, since the latter implies to
select the same strategy that one expects others to select. Furthermore, of all
the above strategies, only (A,A) and (B,B) are evolutionary stable.
Observed behavior of meta-strategies for the baseline game is shown in Ta-
ble 2. When interacting with another university student, 39% of participants
select strategy (A,B) in this game. Note that this is coherent with participants
expecting their interaction partner to act differently (e.g. to choose (B,A)). In
other words, participants seem to strongly identify with each player role (i.e.,
they do not use Rawls’ original position to make their decision): when they
act as player 1, they do not consider what they would do as player 2, and vice
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Strategies
treatment
team club university
(A,A) 14% 14% 13%
(A,B) 19% 29% 39%
(B,A) 10% 10% 13%
(B,B) 57% 47% 34%
Table 2: Meta-strategies in the original position of the baseline game across
treatments (69 observations per treatment).
versa.
However we observe a change in behavior when we consider the team treat-
ment. A Wilcoxon signed rank test indeed indicates that (B,B) is selected
significantly more often in the team treatment (57%) than in the university
treatment (34%, p < 0.001). Considering the independence of strategies played
in the role of player 1 and player 2 further emphasizes this result. We observe
no correlation in the case of the university treatment (Pearson’s chi-squared
test, χ2=0.384, p = 0.535) but a significant correlation in the team treatment
(Pearson’s chi-squared test, χ2=5.694, p = 0.017). For further details, see Ta-
ble 15 in the Appendix. In other words, these results suggest that increasing
social ties leads people to take Rawls’ original position into account.
Similar results can be obtained for the entrance game. In this case, six
distinct strategies need to be considered (see Table 14 for the payoff matrix).11
The transformed entrance game has three pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (1)
both players selecting ((In,A),A); (2) both players selecting (Out,B); (3) one
player selecting ((In,A),B) while the other chooses (Out,A). As in the baseline
game, the latter solution is not consistent with making a decision in Rawls’
original position. In this case, of the six strategies available, only ((In,A),A)
is evolutionary stable.
Similarly to the baseline game, we observe that, in the entrance game,
social ties still lead people to act as if they were in the original position (see
Table 3). A Wilcoxon signed rank test again reveals that ((In,B),B) is selected
11For simplicity, we omit counterfactual strategies (i.e., ((Out,A),·) and ((Out,B),·)) that
are irrelevant to this analysis.
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Strategies
treatment
team club university
((In,A),A) 12% 7% 10%
((In,A),B) 12% 16% 12%
((In,B),A) 4% 9% 7%
((In,B),B) 35% 22% 13%
(Out,A) 7% 17% 19%
(Out,B) 30% 29% 39%
Table 3: Meta-strategies in the original position of the entrance game across
treatments (69 observations).
significantly more often in the team treatment (35%) than in the university
treatment (13%, p < 0.001). More precisely, in the case of the university
treatment, we observe no correlation between players’ choices in both roles
(Pearson’s chi-squared test, χ2=0.950, p = 0.622). However in the team
treatment, a significant correlation is observed (Pearson’s chi-squared test,
χ2=8.897, p = 0.012). For further details, see Table 16 in the Appendix.
Specifically note that in the team treatment, the fairest outcome ((In,B),B)
becomes the modal choice.
Finally we consider the implications of these results with respect to our
subjective measures of connectedness in the particular case of interactions
between teammates. In the context of the baseline game, being closely tied
with other team members according to the group connectedness measure makes
participants select (B,B) significantly more often (73% in group HG; 46% in
group LG; Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.024). On the other hand, this effect
does not replicate through the alternative self connectedness measure (63% in
group HS; 52% in group LS; Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.337). Furthermore,
looking at behavior in the entrance game reveals similar results: being closely
tied with other team members according to the group connectedness measure
makes participants select ((In,B),B) significantly more often (57% in group
HG; 18% in group LG; Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.001). Unlike in the baseline
game, using the self connectedness measure replicates this effect (47% in group
HS; 19% in group LS; Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.016). These results, which
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are illustrated in greater details through Figures 9 and 10 from the Appendix,
indicate that both self and group connectedness lead to choices that are more
in tune with choices that should be taken in Rawls’ original position.
5 Discussion
The experimental study presented in this paper provides clear evidence that
an increase of social ties can help individuals solve asymmetric coordination
problems. We will now discuss to which degree existing theories can explain
these results.
Relevant theories of social preferences cannot fully explain the effect of so-
cial ties that we observe. For example an increase in inequity aversion (Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) would predict the choice of Out
for player 1 in the entrance game. Our results show the opposite tendency. Al-
ternatively, assuming that social ties correlate with stronger reciprocal fairness
(Charness and Rabin, 2002) would predict strong degrees of miscoordination
in the baseline game. Again we observe the opposite result. For more details,
see Attanasi et al. (2014).
Coordination on the (B,B) outcome in the baseline game, and on the
((In,B),B) outcome in the entrance game can however be explained by theories
of team reasoning (Bacharach, 1999; Sugden, 2000, 2003). When an individual
engages in team reasoning, he identifies himself as a member of a group and
conceives that group as a unit of agency acting in pursuit of some collective
objective (Sugden, 2000). In other words, such an individual will act for the
interest of his group by identifying and implementing a strategy profile that
maximizes the collective payoff of the group.
Under Bacharach’s concept of unreliable team interaction (Bacharach, 1999),
a given player identifies with a team with a certain probability p and chooses
the action which maximizes the team benefit. With probability 1 − p the
player is self-interested and maximizes his own benefit. In the context of our
experiment, given a sufficiently high probability of team reasoning, the play-
ers should coordinate on the (B,B) outcome in the baseline game, and on the
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((In,B),B) outcome in the entrance game. Following this theory, our results
imply that players in the team treatment are more likely to use team reason-
ing than in the university treatment (especially when they believe in strong
group connectedness within their team). However, note that the theory only
considers binary types of reasoning: either one follows team reasoning, or not.
Yet, given the multiple levels of self evoked by social identity theory, we might
consider a more gradual notion of group identification. As a result, existing
theories of team reasoning fail to fully capture the possibility of different levels
of social connectedness (see Attanasi et al. (2014) for more details regarding
team reasoning and its main limitation in the context of social ties).
Another theory, which can explain the observed behavior in our experi-
ment, is the theory of empathetic preferences (see Binmore, 1994, 1998, 2005).
Binmore argues that an individual may be equipped with some empathetic
preferences, which consist in combining his actual own preferences with his
preferences when imagining himself to be in the other person’s position. For
example, in the context of the baseline game, an empathizing player 1 would
compare his own preferences while being himself (i.e., player 1) with his pref-
erences while being player 2.12 If making a decision based on such an interper-
sonal comparison of preferences, player 1 is said to empathize with player 2.
The idea is thus linked to Rawls’ concept of the original position (see Section
4.3). According to the analysis of the meta-strategies discussed in Section 4.3,
we can thus say that players empathize more with each other in the presence
of social ties. However, Binmore’s theory can also not fully capture the con-
cept of gradual social ties as it does not quantify the degree of empathizing
behavior, that is, how choices are altered for intermediate levels of empathy.
Finally, the model of homo moralis (Alger and Weibull, 2013, p. 2276) can
also be used to interpret our results. Homo moralis faces a trade-off between
maximizing his own material payoff, and doing ’the right thing,’ that is, choose
12Binmore points out that, when projecting himself to be in player 2’s position, player 1
must not consider his own preferences as player 1, he must instead imagine himself while
having player 2’s preferences: since player 2 prefers outcome (B,B) to outcome (A,A), player
1 should share this preference when putting himself in player 2’s position, even though he
prefers (A,A) to (B,B) as player 1.
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a strategy that, if used by all individuals, would lead to the highest possible
payoff.” Given our experimental findings, the degree of morality seems to be
stronger in the presence of stronger social ties. It should however be noted
that this model assumes a symmetric game structure and thus strictly has to
be related to the findings discussed in Section 4.3 (i.e., assuming participants
make their decision behind the veil of ignorance).
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A Measurement of subjective connectedness
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the kind of questions that were used in our experi-
ment. Note that the individuals’ faces have been voluntarily blurred to ensure
anonymity.
Figure 7: Measuring an individual’s self connectedness with another team
member.
Figure 8: Measuring individual C’s belief of the group connectedness.
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B Experimental Instructions
B.1 Preliminary Instructions
We are going to present two games that you will have to play with some
unknown participants. One of these games will then be drawn in order to
determine your actual earnings.
Each game considers two players. You will be asked to take a decision as
player 1 and as player 2. At the end of the experiment, we will randomly
assign one of these two roles to you.
Your actual earning will then depend on your decision in the role that will
be assigned to you as well as your partner’s decision in the selected game.
Therefore, each of your decisions is important. So please take every question
seriously by carefully answering them.
Moreover your participation to this experiment relies on the fact that you
answered every single question.
If anything is unclear or if you have any question, please do not hesitate
to raise your hand so that we can bring you the clarification that you need.
B.2 Instructions of the baseline game
During this experiment, you will interact with some randomly selected player
in a game that is defined as follows.
In the first stage, some initial amount are given to both you and your
opponent:
• 20 euros for player 1
• 10 euros for player 2
No decision needs to be taken by any player during this stage.
In the second stage, every player will then have to choose simultaneously
between two distinct moves A and B.
In the second stage:
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• If every player chooses to play A, 5 euros will be withdrawn from player
2 ’s initial amount and 15 euros will be added to player 1 ’s initial amount.
Thus player 1 will get 35 euros while player 2 will get 5 euros.
• If every player chooses to play B, 5 euros will be withdrawn from player
1 ’s initial amount and 25 euros will be added to player 2 ’s initial amount.
Thus player 1 will get 15 euros while player 2 will get 35 euros.
• If the players’ choices are different from each other, then both players’
amount will be reset to zero (each will thus get 0 euro).
The following table summarizes the various choices and payoffs from the
second stage:
A
A
B
B
(1): 35
(2): 5
(1): 0
(2): 0
(1): 15
(2): 35
(1): 0
(2): 0
This simultaneous decision ends both the second stage and the game. All
along the game, both players will remain anonymous to one another. You will
receive the corresponding amount if this game is eventually being selected.
These instructions concern the three situations described below.
B.3 Questions for the baseline game
In the context of the previous game, you will play with X 13 (select one answer
per question).
• Please indicate your choice if you are acting as player 1:
In the second stage, you play:
13Depending on the matching process, X may stand for “a university student”, “a club
member”, or “a teammate”. Each subject answered the following two questions (as player
1 and as player 2) for all three values of X (See Section 3 for details about the matching
process).
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A B
In% Out%
• Please indicate your choice if you are acting as player 2:
In the second stage, you play:
A B
In% Out%
Note that the three previous pair of questions (with, as opponent: a uni-
versity student, a club member, or a teammate) are independent from one
another. Please make sure to answer each of them.
B.4 Instructions of the entrance game
During this experiment, you will interact with some randomly selected player
in a game that is defined as follows.
In the first stage, some initial amount are given to both you and your
opponent:
• 20 euros for player 1
• 10 euros for player 2
Then, the two following options become available to player 1 :
• The “Out” option implies that every player keeps their initial amount
and the game ends.
• The alternative option (“In”) implies entering a second stage where each
player will have to take another decision. In the latter case, both players
will then have to choose simultaneously between two distinct moves A
and B.
In the second stage:
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• If every player chooses to play A, 5 euros will be withdrawn from player
2 ’s initial amount and 15 euros will be added to player 1 ’s initial amount.
Thus player 1 will get 35 euros while player 2 will get 5 euros.
• If every player chooses to play B, 5 euros will be withdrawn from player
1 ’s initial amount and 25 euros will be added to player 2 ’s initial amount.
Thus player 1 will get 15 euros while player 2 will get 35 euros.
• If the players’ choices are different from each other, then both players’
amount will be reset to zero (each will thus get 0 euro).
The following table summarizes the various choices and payoffs from the
second stage:
A
A
B
B
(1): 35
(2): 5
(1): 0
(2): 0
(1): 15
(2): 35
(1): 0
(2): 0
This simultaneous decision ends both the second stage and the game. All
along the game, both players will remain anonymous to one another. You will
receive the corresponding amount if this game is eventually being selected.
These instructions concern the three situations described below.
B.5 Questions for the entrance game
In the context of the previous game, you will play with X 14 (select one answer
per question).
• Please indicate your choice while you are acting as player 1:
In the first stage, you play:
14Depending on the matching process, X may stand for “a university student”, “a club
member”, or “a teammate”. Each subject answered the following two questions (as player
1 and as player 2) for all three values of X (See Section 3 for details about the matching
process).
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A B
In% Out%
In the second stage (assume that you played “In” first), you play:
A B
In% Out%
• Please indicate your choice while you are acting as player 2:
In the second stage (assume that your opponent played “In” first), you
play:
A B
In% Out%
Note that the three previous pair of questions (with, as opponent: a uni-
versity student, a club member, or a teammate) are independent from one
another. Please make sure to answer each of them.
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C Additional tables
Throughout this section, all figures include Wilcoxon signed rank test results
concerning mean rank differences in behavior across treatments (i.e., team,
club, university). Moreover, some tables also include Mann-Whitney test re-
sults that allow comparing behavior across the various groups from Table 1.
Note that in all statistical tests, only p values lower than 0.2 are displayed in
the tables. p values larger than 0.2 are classified as not significant (n.s.).
C.1 Baseline game
players
Matching types
Wilcoxon signed rank test
(p values)
team club university
team vs team vs club vs
university club university
1 68% 58% 49% 0.002 0.090 0.109
2 77% 77% 74% n.s. n.s. n.s.
Table 4: Choosing B in the baseline game for each player in each type of
matching (69 observations).
Player
Matching types
Wilcoxon signed rank test
Groups
(p values)
team club university
team vs team vs club vs
university club university
HS 1 76% 68% 58% 0.008 n.s. 0.102
(38 obs.) 2 79% 74% 74% n.s. n.s. n.s.
LS 1 58% 45% 39% 0.058 n.s. n.s.
(31 obs.) 2 74% 80% 74% n.s. n.s. n.s.
HS vs LS 1 0.109 0.053 0.115
(p values) 2 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Table 5: Choosing B in the baseline game based on groups HS (kSi ≥ KS) and
LS (kSi < K
S).
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Player
Matching types
Wilcoxon signed rank test
Groups
(p values)
team club university
team vs team vs club vs
university club university
HG 1 83% 73% 63% 0.014 0.179 0.179
(30 obs.) 2 83% 83% 73% 0.179 n.s. 0.083
LG 1 56% 46% 38% 0.035 n.s. n.s.
(39 obs.) 2 72% 72% 74% n.s. n.s. n.s.
HG vs LG 1 0.018 0.024 0.042
(p values) 2 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Table 6: Choosing B in the baseline game based on groups HG (kGi ≥ KG)
and LG (kGi < K
G).
C.2 Entrance game
Tables 7, 9 and 11 depict player 1’s choice in the entrance game. Note
that these tables ignore counterfactual strategies (i.e., strategies (Out,A) and
(Out,B)). Moreover, these tables include Wilcoxon signed rank tests that com-
pare how often did subjects perform a given strategy (e.g., (In,A)) with how
often did they choose any other strategy (e.g., (In,B) or Out) in any two
treatments. Tables 8, 10 and 12 depict player 2’s choice in the entrance game,
together with Wilcoxon signed rank tests.
Choices
Matching types
Wilcoxon signed rank test
(p values)
team club university
team vs team vs club vs
university club university
(In,A) 23% 23% 21% n.s. n.s. n.s.
(In,B) 39% 30% 20% 0.003 0.157 0.035
Out 38% 47% 59% 0.004 0.083 0.059
Table 7: Player 1’s behavior in the entrance game (69 observations).
Matching types
Wilcoxon signed rank test
(p values)
team club university
team vs team vs club vs
university club university
77% 67% 64% 0.049 0.108 n.s.
Table 8: Choosing B for player 2 in the entrance game (69 observations).
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Groups Choices
Matching types
Wilcoxon signed rank test
(p values)
team club university
team vs team vs club vs
university club university
HS
(In,A) 18% 8% 13% n.s. 0.102 n.s.
(38 obs.)
(In,B) 50% 39% 24% 0.007 n.s. 0.034
Out 32% 53% 63% 0.001 0.011 0.157
LS
(In,A) 29% 42% 32% n.s. n.s. n.s.
(31 obs.)
(In,B) 26% 19% 16% 0.180 n.s. n.s.
Out 45% 39% 52% n.s. 0.157 n.s.
HS vs LS
(In,A) n.s. 0.001 n.s.
(p values)
(In,B) 0.042 0.073 n.s.
Out 0.193 n.s. n.s.
Table 9: Player 1’s behavior in the entrance game based on groups HS (kSi ≥
KS) and LS (kSi < K
S).
Matching types
Wilcoxon signed rank test
Groups
(p values)
team club university
team vs team vs club vs
university club university
HS (38 obs.) 76% 71% 68% n.s. n.s. n.s.
LS (31 obs.) 77% 61% 58% 0.083 0.095 n.s.
HS vs LS
n.s. n.s. n.s.
(p values)
Table 10: Choosing B for player 2 in the entrance game based on groups HS
(kSi ≥ KS) and LS (kSi < KS).
40
Groups Choices
Matching types
Wilcoxon signed rank test
(p values)
team club university
team vs team vs club vs
university club university
HG
(In,A) 13% 23% 13% n.s. n.s. n.s.
(38 obs.)
(In,B) 57% 30% 20% 0.002 0.021 0.180
Out 30% 47% 67% 0.002 0.058 0.058
LG
(In,A) 31% 23% 28% n.s. n.s. n.s.
(31 obs.)
(In,B) 26% 31% 20% n.s. n.s. 0.102
Out 43% 46% 52% n.s. n.s. n.s.
HG vs LG
(In,A) 0.091 n.s. 0.140
(p values)
(In,B) 0.009 n.s. n.s.
Out n.s. n.s. n.s.
Table 11: Player 1’s behavior in the entrance game based on groups HG (kGi ≥
KG) and LG (kGi < K
G).
Matching types
Wilcoxon signed rank test
Groups
(p values)
team club university
team vs team vs club vs
university club university
HG (30 obs.) 90% 70% 63% 0.011 0.057 n.s.
LG (39 obs.) 67% 64% 64% n.s. n.s. n.s.
HG vs LG
0.016 n.s. n.s.
(p values)
Table 12: Choosing B for player 2 in the entrance subgame based on groups
HG (kGi ≥ KG) and LG (kGi < KG).
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D Behind the veil of ignorance
Tables 13 and 14 represent respectively the payoff matrices of the baseline
game and the entrance game when played behind the veil of ignorance.
Player X
Player Y
(A,A) (A,B) (B,A) (B,B)
(A,A) 20 2.5 17.5 0
(A,B) 17.5 0 35 17.5
(B,A) 2.5 10 0 7.5
(B,B) 0 7.5 17.5 25
Table 13: Average payoffs for row Player X in the transformed baseline game.
Player X
Player Y
((In,A),A) ((In,A),B) ((In,B),A) ((In,B),B) (Out,A) (Out,B)
((In,A),A) 20 2.55 17.5 0 22.5 5
((In,A),B) 17.5 0 35 17.5 22.5 5
((In,B),A) 2.5 10 0 7.5 5 12.5
((In,B),B) 0 7.5 17.5 25 5 12.5
(Out,A) 12.5 12.5 10 10 15 15
(Out,B) 10 10 27.5 27.5 15 15
Table 14: Average payoffs for row Player X in the transformed entrance game.
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Tables 15 and 16 depict tests of independence of behavioral variables in
the baseline game (playing A/B as player 1 vs playing A/B as player 2) and
the entrance game (playing (In,A)/(In,B)/Out as player 1 vs playing A/B as
player 2) respectively.
Decision as player 1 (A/B)
Matching types
vs decision as player 2 (A/B)
(Pearson’s chi-squared test) team club university
χ2 5.694 1.729 0.384
p value 0.017 0.189 0.535
Table 15: Independence of decisions as both players in the baseline game (69
observations).
Decision as player 1 ((In,A)/(In,B)/Out)
Matching types
vs decision as player 2 (A/B)
(Pearson’s chi-squared test) team club university
χ2 8.897 0.495 0.950
p value 0.012 0.781 0.622
Table 16: Independence of decisions as both players in the entrance game (69
observations).
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Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the observed behavior in the baseline game and
the entrance game respectively, under the assumption that those games are
played behind the veil of ignorance.
(a) Classification based on self connectedness
(b) Classification based on group connectedness
Figure 9: Behavior in the original position of the baseline game (Team treat-
ment).
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(a) Classification based on self connectedness
(b) Classification based on group connectedness
Figure 10: Behavior in the original position of the entrance game (Team treat-
ment).
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